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The management of environmental flows needs new concepts of governance. What 
is the role of government in this context? And what is the role of the nation state? 
The fact that environmental flows are typically of global nature leads to the question 
whether the nation state is still able to fulfill its relevant functions in times of economic 
and political globalization. Before turning to these main questions, I would like to 
briefly introduce and discuss the concepts of ‘environmental flows’ and ‘environ-
mental state’. 
The cleaning and reduction of environmental flows 
The concept of environmental flows was introduced by Mol and Spaargaren (2003). 
Using their concept, they focus on both the “changing material flows in products and 
environmental goods” and the “social relations and networks that give origin to, or 
accompany” such flows (Mol et al., 2003: 5-6). This concept may be more relevant in 
theory than in empirical research or in the field of policy consultation. As a theoretical 
concept, it is innovative and seems to have a high heuristic potential. It may be useful 
to identify different institutional contexts that frame the environmentally relevant ma-
terial flows (Adriaanse et al., 1997). By adopting this broader approach rather than 
focusing on a single emission, product or sector, one can enlarge and possibly opti-
mize the spectrum of intervention. This includes the identification of the main veto 
players in the chain of environmental flows (Jacob, 2003; Tsebelis, 2002). 
 Without discussing the concept in detail, I would however propose to first focus the 
concept on material flows in terms of their environmental impacts, and then analyze 
the societal conditions that influence the flows in a second step. Material flows in 
terms of their environmental impacts are complex in their own right! They include not 
only movements of matter within space (e.g., as basic materials, goods, or emis-
sions) but also several changes in their environmental impacts as well as different 
combinations with other material flows. As environmental flows they, indeed, also 
have a societal dimension because they are both essentially influenced by the sys-
tem of consumption and production and relevant as far as the human environment 
and health is concerned. 
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 At the Free University of Berlin we have so far used the concept of ‘material flows’ 
in connection with a model of policy intervention (Jänicke, 1995; Jänicke and Zi-
eschank, 2004). For many good reasons, the scientific debate has come to trace en-
vironmental impacts back to material flows. But it makes sense to use the more com-
prehensive concept of environmental flows to denominate both the material flows and 
the possible disturbing processes within the environment. The concept of environ-
mental flows—if conceived as material flows in terms of their environmental im-
pacts—could prevent us from using a too simplistic concept of material use leading to 
undifferentiated postulates like ‘factor 10’ or ‘factor 4’.1 This is often restricted to a 
‘tonnage ideology’, which has little to say about the various kinds of environmental 
impacts which tend to be quite different and therefore require different forms of ob-
servation and control. 
 Instead of ‘factor 10’ postulates, I suggest a postulate that I call the cleaning and 
reduction of material flows (see below). ‘Cleaning of environmental flows’ (e. g. by 
substitution of dangerous substances) seems to be even more important than their 
‘reduction’. The paradigm for this postulate could be the new ‘REACH system’ of the 
EU Commission, or also the field of climate protection, where the reduction of energy 
consumption is of course a precondition for any success, but the cleansing of the en-
ergy mix from fossil and nuclear energies is even more important. For a long time, 
the paradigm for de-materialization and ‘factor 10’ (or 4) has been the area of waste 
management and recycling. However, this area comprises a segment of environ-
mental flows that is too small (less than 10 per cent) and should not be overburdened 
by the general task of resource management. 
 Figure 1 provides a schematic model of the governance of environmental flows. As 
noted in Figure 1, environmental flows typically involve four stages: (1) the input of 
environmental resources; (2) the conversion process of production and consumption 
(constituting the ‘driving forces’ in terms of the well-known OECD model 
(http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/0/52/1933638.pdf); (3) the output of negative envi-
ronmental effects (the ‘pressures’ of the OECD model) and (4) the resulting environ-
mental state of the landscape, resources, species, or ecological functions (leading to 
final ‘impacts’). 
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Source: Jänicke and Zieschank (2004) 
One can similarly distinguish four stages in the development of environmental policy: 
The starting point is the visibly bad state of the environment. The main approach was 
reparation and management of environmental damages, combined with some insuffi-
cient reactive interventions like the dilution of pollution (‘high chimney policy’). The 
next step consists of attempts to reduce the level of environmental pressure. Here, 
the main policy approach was the use of technical prescriptions for emissions and 
waste, typically leading to add-on technologies. The basic idea was to separate the 
system of production and consumption from the environment as far as possible, es-
sentially by technical means and technical prescriptions. For various reasons, this 
proved to be possible only to a certain degree. The limits to this approach can be 
observed, for example, in the field of agriculture or regarding dissipative losses of all 
kind. In the third stage, which occurred primarily in the 1990s, environmental policy 
has therefore turned to bring about a conversion process within the system of pro-
duction and consumption. Here, the general governance approach has so far been 
the broadest. The policy orientation has changed from technical standards (related to 
specified environmental impacts) to sectoral strategies, based on dialogue and coop-
eration. The debate on modern environmental governance is essentially a debate 
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about the governance of conversion processes. The final stage could possibly be the 
reduction of the input of material flows, since there is almost no environmental pres-
sure without material flows. The taxation of the input to stimulate efficient resource 
use, including recycling, could be a plausible instrument for such preventive strate-
gies. However, the ex-ante reduction of material flows necessarily leads to a reduced 
importance of powerful sectors such as mining, energy, basic industries or construc-
tion (reduced input of land). For many reasons, which cannot be discussed here, this 
approach has proven to be extremely difficult. Beyond the taxation of mineral oil, only 
a few input taxes exist in OECD countries. 
 Therefore, the environmental flows within the system of production and consump-
tion currently are—and remain—the central challenge to modern environmental gov-
ernance. This development of the environmental policy discourse has led to several 
proposals. The most important is the proposed ‘framework programme on sustain-
able production and consumption patterns’, developed by the UN Johannesburg 
Summit. Trying to implement the latter, the EU Commission has launched an initia-
tive on the sustainable use of natural resources. 
 The sphere of production and consumption is the most important field for a strate-
gic ‘cleaning and reduction’ of environmental flows. Governance of environmental 
flows is necessarily multi-stakeholder, multi-sector and multi-level governance (see 
Figure 2). The traditional instruments of environmental state intervention (both stan-
dards and taxes) are still important, e.g., in the field of climate protection (obligatory 
feed-in tariffs, or energy-efficiency standards like the Japanese ‘Top Runner Pro-
gramme’). But at the same time, additional approaches for making better use of the 
existing motivation and innovation potential within society and the business sector 
are necessary. Therefore, all kinds of modern cooperative governance have gained 
importance, not least to avoid complicated decision-making processes by negotiating 
‘in the shadow of hierarchy’ (Scharpf, 1998). This includes sectoral strategies and 
environmental policy integration. 
 As a result of the Rio Process and the experiences with environmental policy re-
form after 1992, patterns of governance have become more and more differentiated 
and complex. This is a process of trial and error, which is still going on. 
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The environmental state 
The concept of the “green state” (Dryzek et al., 2003) or environmental state (Mol / 
Buttel, 2002, Mol et al., 2003) may be useful in this context. It has been invented and 
re-invented several times since the late 1980s (Kloepfer, 1989). Today, it is a possi-
ble formula for the ecological dimension of modern governance in terms of the three–
pillar approach of sustainable development. Beyond this, the environmental state 
relates to one of the three cross-sectoral meta functions or “core interests” (Dryzek et 
al., 2003) that can be attributed to modern government in general—the economic, 
social and ecological meta function, which determine more than one policy field (see 
also Jänicke, 1990: 8-9): 
• The economic meta function—which is historically the oldest—to provide the nec-
essary regulatory framework and infrastructure for economic development and 
growth. Relevant policy fields (beyond economic affaires) include energy, trans-
port, agriculture, housing, finance and research and education. Main political pro-
ponents are industrial organizations, liberal and conservative parties. 
• The social meta function comprising the provision of social security and redistribu-
tion (‘welfare state’). Relevant policy fields include social affairs, labor market, 
health, education, housing, (public) transport and consumer protection. Main po-
litical proponents are trade-unions, welfare organizations, churches and left-wing 
parties. 
• The ecological meta function to assure the protection of the environment (‘envi-
ronmental state’). Relevant policy fields (beyond environmental protection) in-
clude research and education, consumer protection and especially the environ-
mental divisions of all those policy sectors responsible for environmentally-
intensive production sectors. Main political proponents are environmental NGOs, 
parts of the media and the scientific community as well as green (and partly other) 
parties.  
Already in the late 1980s, Kloepfer, Forsthoff and Hofmann have used the concept of 
the environmental state (‘Umweltstaat’) in the context of the basic objectives of the 
constitutional law. They distinguished the ecological functions of the modern state 
from the functions of “state under the rule of law”, “industrial state” and ‘welfare state’ 
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(Kloepfer, 1989, see also Callies, 2001). Later on, Bruno Dente  conceived the 
‘ecological state’ as ‘a broker’ playing with all the involved actors “a complex set of 
games with the idea of decreasing resource consumption at all levels” (Dente, 1998: 
11). This notion is very close to an understanding of the environmental state as the 
core of governing environmental flows (Mol et al., 2003). Typically the environmental 
(ecological, green)  state is also defined in the context of global governnance. 
 The following relationships between environmental flows and the environmental 
state may be especially relevant: First, environmental flows do not only have different 
effects on environmental media such as air, water, or soil, but also differ from one 
sector to the other, for example, from energy production to the chemical industry or 
from agriculture to construction. As far as their environmental impacts are concerned, 
the management of environmental flows has therefore to deal with the inherent logic 
of each sector. Environmental policy integration and sectoral environmental strate-
gies are an indispensable part of cleansing and reducing environmental flows. If one 
takes into consideration the cross sectoral importance of environmental issues, the 
concept of environmental state proves to be analytically useful. 
 Second, the management of environmental flows within the system of production 
and consumption is impossible without giving a strong role and responsibility to those 
actors that cause and influence such flows. Compared to governments who act in a 
narrower legal framework with many veto players in the decision-making process, 
retailers or companies are often in a better position to end the use of substances or 
products causing environmental stress. Also, the innovation potential of industrial 
actors can be activated and used better if there is a close and cooperative relation-
ship between government and the target group. The network could be broadened 
and strengthened by including environmental scientists, NGOs or other civil society 
actors. The governance of environmental flows is therefore commonly achieved by 
public and private actors.  
 Finally, in a similar manner, governance of environmental flows means reaching 
beyond the nation state. The flows of raw materials, (semi-)goods, emissions, or 
waste often cross national borders. Their management, therefore, cannot be re-
stricted to national policies. Consequently, the governance of environmental flows 
must be conceived as multi-level governance and governing beyond the nation-state. 
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This is why Dente and Kloepfer stressed the role of the ecological state within the 
global context. 
 All this leads to a highly complex picture of modern multi-sectoral, multi-
stakeholder and multi-level environmental governance. Figure 2 aims to portray this 
complexity by showing graphically the different dimensions of environmental govern-
ance: political levels (individual- to global-level), social actors (civil society, govern-
ment, and business), and environmentally sensitive economic sectors (industry, en-
ergy, transport, and so on). The situation can be even more complex, if we bear in 
mind that the relationship between the actors involved can range from one-sided 
government influence on industry (as in the beginning of environmental policy), to 
strong business influence on government (even as capture!) or to various forms of 
cooperation between the two sides. 
















Source: Jänicke (2003). 
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Reinventing government  
There are three main challenges to the role of government and the nation–state, all 
of which seem to contradict the postulate of a strong and more effective environ-
mental state. The first key challenge is that of environmental governance: Today, en-
vironmental goods are produced by a large number of public and/or private actors. 
This leads to utterly complex actor-constellations across sectors and levels and has 
given rise to the concept of governance, often conceived as a substitute to ‘govern-
ment’. Political globalization—the globalization of policies (and especially that of envi-
ronmental policy) which is said to reduce the role of the sovereign nation-state—is 
the second key challenge. Finally there is the challenge of economic globalization; 
the role of international markets and multinational corporations is said to put pressure 
on the scope of action of the nation-state. 
 Before turning to the role of the nation-state in the process of political and eco-
nomic globalization, it is worth mentioning that in the context of environmental gov-
ernance the role of government in general needs to be reinvented. Even if voluntary 
agreements were a general solution, someone would have to make sure that the ul-
timate goal is finally reached (OECD, 2003). These soft instruments do not work 
without the final say of governments, which includes the ultimate option of hard regu-
latory interventions (‘negotiation in the shadow of hierarchy’). In addition, participa-
tion, ‘voluntarisation’ and consensus need to be complemented by competent mod-
eration and professional public management. Due to market failure, environmental 
innovation and its diffusion also needs governmental support. Sectoral strategies and 
the transition management of dirty industries need a strong role of government poli-
cies. The Government is the main address, if there are problems such as flooding or 
BSE. In the late 1990s, almost 80 per cent of the EU directives and regulations were 
still of the ‘command-and-control’ variety (Holzinger et al., 2003). 
 In this context, it should also be underlined that cooperative approaches to gov-
ernance need additional government capacities. The total administrative load that is 
required to develop such modes of government can be ‘surprisingly high’ (Jordan et 
al., 2003: 222). The UK environment ministry, for example, recently devoted 17 peo-
ple to negotiating 42 voluntary agreements. 
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 There is no doubt that government as a bureaucratic rulemaking machine—with its 
inherent tendency to expand its regulatory activity—has reached its limits. There is 
also a relevant potential of activated environmental self-regulation in the sphere of 
production and consumption. This private potential of action was the starting point of 
the debate on modern governance and steering beyond government. Modern gov-
ernance is especially important if we turn to the difficult task of influencing environ-
mental flows in the business sector, e.g., flows along the chain of production and the 
life cycle of a product. However, in the growing complexity of environmental govern-
ance the question of final responsibility for solving the relevant environmental prob-
lems has become crucial. If everybody is responsible, nobody will be responsible. In 
this regard there is no functional equivalent to national government. Its role has 
changed, but not diminished.  
The environmental state and the internationalization of policies 
As regards the nation-state and national government, we are faced with similar ques-
tions: Their role has changed, and there is without any doubt a loss of national sov-
ereignty in the context of global governance. But is this equivalent to a general with-
ering away of the environmental state? Or has the loss in sovereignty been compen-
sated by a new potential of collective government action? Are environmental policy 
and the governance of environmental flows different from other policies that have 
come under high pressure in the context of globalization? 
 There are, indeed, several restrictions on national environmental policy: restric-
tions by WTO regulations, by EU internal market regulations or by the present role of 
the USA in the global environmental policy arena. But the fear of a general weaken-
ing of the nation-state has so far not been confirmed by empirical research. 
 Regarding the role of national governments in global environmental governance, I 
would like to present some theses, based on different empirical studies. 
Thesis 1. Globalization has created a policy arena for pioneer countries, at least in 
environmental policy. And pioneer countries play an important role in the develop-
ment of global environmental governance. Pioneering environmental policy of certain 
(highly developed) countries has always been possible since 1970. The influence of 
small innovative countries in global policy has never before been as important as to-
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day in the field of environmental policy (Andersen and Liefferink, 1997; Jänicke and 
Weidner, 1997; Jänicke and Jacob, 2001; Andersson and Mol, 2002). This influence 
is especially important with respect to the development of global environmental gov-
ernance as observed in Rio de Janeiro (1992) and Johannesburg (2002). Political 
globalization has created a policy arena for political competition, wherein the pioneer 
roles of countries are relevant (Meyer et al., 1997). International institutions like the 
OECD or the UNEP, but also global networks of all kinds, provide a basis for bench-
marking and competition in global environmental policy. Regulatory competition gives 
support to domestic innovative industries or protects the ‘national regulatory culture’ 
against pressures to adapt to policy innovation from abroad. The present regulatory 
competition regarding fuel-efficient products shows signs of ‘green protectionism’, if 
we take the ‘Top Runner Programme’ of Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade, and 
Industry (METI) as a far-reaching example. 
Thesis 2. The nation state is both the subject and object of global environmental pol-
icy learning and lesson-drawing. The national government is the subject of policy 
learning on how to solve environmental problems. At the same time national govern-
ments are looking for best practice, observing other governments (Rose, 1993; Ben-
nett, 1991; Kern et al., 2001; Tews et al., 2003). Thereby, successful environmental 
policy innovations—the introduction of new institutions, instruments, or strategies—
are often adopted by other governments. This improvement by imitation can be con-
ceived as horizontal policy learning. It is an important mechanism of global environ-
mental policy development and policy convergence. International institutions such as 
the OECD, UNEP or special regimes play an important role as agents for the diffu-
sion of environmental policy innovations. This role seems to be more important than 
the creation of policy innovations by the international institutions themselves. Figure 
3 provides some examples for the process of diffusion of environmental policy inno-
vations (such as environmental ministries or green plans) from pioneer countries to 
the rest of the world. The speed of diffusion increased in the 1990s, apparently due 
to the fact that the mobilization prior to and after Rio greatly affected the process of 
environmental policy diffusion. This may imply capacity building at the national level, 
even if the divergence of capacities (behind the convergent policy patterns) remains 
high. 
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Figure 3. The Global Diffusion of Environmental Policy Innovations:  
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Thesis 3. Globalization has very different effects on policy areas. The international 
pressure on wages as well as on taxes on mobile sources or social security provi-
sions is a reality in times of globalization (Scharpf, 1998). But environmental (as well 
as health or security) standards have their own rules (e.g., WTO) and their own logic 
in international regulatory competition. It seems that the conditions for concerted ac-
tions of environmental ministers in the global arena are at least not adverse, if com-
pared with other policies. Environmental policy has demonstrated considerable com-
petence in using the opportunity structure of multi-level governance. 
Thesis 4. Environmental policy innovation as well as environmental policy regression 
is primarily caused at the national level. In an expert inquiry for 20 different countries, 
we sought to identify the main sectors with environmental problems and restrictions. 
According to our survey, it is the energy sector, followed by road traffic, agriculture 
and construction, that faces the most persistent environmental restrictions (Jänicke 
and Weidner, 1997). Interestingly, these sectors do not generally face fierce global 
competition, and, in fact, the contrary—for example, the fact that agriculture and the 
power and construction industries strongly depend upon domestic demand—is 
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largely the case. Again, it is often that the nation state (typically influenced by domes-
tic polluting industries) that resists international regulation: Countries such as the 
USA, Japan, the UK or, more recently, Denmark are examples of the double option 
of being either an innovator or a laggard in environmental policy. This range of op-
tions, at least for the highly developed countries, once again contradicts the argu-
ment of a general weakening of the nation state. 
Thesis 5. Global environmental governance strongly depends on both the compe-
tence and creativity of national governments, and on the international system as a 
complex mechanism of policy diffusion and coordination. Of course this (‘horizontal’) 
view on the role of national governments is no alternative to the (‘vertical’) view on 
international institutions. The transformation of the nation state is a transformation 
within the context of international policy networks and institutions. And the interna-
tional system is an indispensable mechanism of policy diffusion and coordination. 
Moreover, the international system provides the policy arena, which is important for 
pioneer roles and pioneering alliances in environmental policy.  
 The interesting question is whether international regulation or the competitive role 
of pioneer countries represents the main engine for global environmental policy de-
velopment. At the Johannesburg Summit, the EU (strongly influenced by the German 
government) has for the first time gone beyond the (often minimalist) global consen-
sus by stressing its pioneer role. Together with a large group of about 90 countries, 
the EU is going to follow an ambitious policy to support renewable energies (Johan-
nesburg Renewable Energy Coalition). This is a new orientation focusing more on 
horizontal mechanisms of innovation/diffusion and competitive pressure than on 
global consensus at any price. 
Thesis 6: There is no substitute for the nation state in multi-level environmental 
governance as regards financial resources, professional competence, coercive 
power, or pressure for legitimation. The manpower of national governments is signifi-
cantly higher than e. g. that of the sectretariats of international regimes (US-EPA: 
18.000 employees vs. some hundred in international organisations).  As a rule, the 
state is also the most complex nexus of relationships, being part of highly differenti-
ated global and domestic expert networks (French, 2002: 141). Generally, it has the 
highest visibility and is the ‘first address’ in case of complaints (Willke, 1992). There 
is no comparable public pressure on political actors in Brussels or even on the global 
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level. Finally, it is the national innovation system and the national lead market that 
play the most important role in the process of global ecological modernization. 
The environmental state in the global economy 
The most pessimistic arguments regarding the capacity of the nation state focus on 
the presumably restrictive role of the global economy. The most popular argument is 
the ‘race-to-the-bottom’ (RTB) hypothesis of a regulatory downward-competition be-
tween countries, in which the positions of governments in fields like environmental 
policy deteriorate.  
Thesis 7. There is no ‘race to the bottom’ in environmental policy—but why? Several 
empirical cross-national studies have rejected the RTB-hypothesis. This discussion 
was extremely important and has provided many insights into the role of environ-
mental policy in the competition between national economies. Many arguments 
against the RTB-hypothesis are well known today (Vogel, 2001; Wheeler, 2001; 
Drezner, 2001): Countries and companies that trade with countries with strict regula-
tions tends to have stricter policies themselves (Eliste and Fredricksson, 1998; Fol-
janty-Jost, 1997)—the largest markets are rather strictly regulated. The globalization 
of environmental policy has partly changed the framework conditions of the world 
market (Jänicke and Weidner, 1997; Weidner and Jänicke, 2002; Vogel, 2001). 
Regulatory competition with respect to the environment often creates first-mover ad-
vantages for national economies. This is part of the larger pattern of global competi-
tion (Porter and Van der Linde, 1995; Wallace, 1995) and is essential for the devel-
opment of ‘environmental lead markets’ (Jänicke and Jacob, 2001). Multinationals 
tend to use the same standards everywhere (Wheeler, 2000). Differences in envi-
ronmental standards therefore tend to decrease; generally they are less important 
than differences in, for example, labor costs or taxes.  
 In addition to the preceding observations in the recent literature that cautions 
against the RTB hypothesis, I would like to add three arguments: First, the environ-
mental issue has, to a certain degree, become a dimension of general technological 
progress. Forty percent of technological innovations in 2010 are anticipated to be 
relevant for environmental improvement (Faucheux, 2000). Second, the environ-
mental issue has become important in the light of international competition for inno-
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vation. Finally, strict environmental regulations (within limits) remain a possibility to 
protect or support national industries. There has been some complaint about ‘green 
protectionism’—for example when the EU commission proposed a comprehensive 
regulation for chemical substances (REACH) in 2003. The ambitious ‘Top Runner 
Programme’ of the Japanese METI noted above, which is to increase the energy effi-
ciency even of imported products, has been prompted by similar protests in USA 
administration about a violation of WTO rules (which interestingly did not prevent the 
METI from extending the program!). All three arguments are extremely important for 
convincing (at least) some OECD governments to regulate environmental flows by 
assuming a pioneer role that may also influence other countries. 
Thesis 8. Pioneer countries in environmental policy are highly competitive. The 
Global Competitiveness Report shows a remarkably high correlation (R2 = 0.89) be-
tween the ambitiousness of environmental policy and the competitiveness of a coun-
try (World Economic Forum, 2000). Other studies have revealed a similar relationship 
(Sturm et al., 2000). These correlations, of course, do not constitute causal proof. 
The causal relations can go in both directions, and third factors (e.g., the GNP per 
capita) may be important in explaining both competitiveness and the ambitiousness 
of environmental policy. But in the light of such a sizable correlation, one can no 
longer insist on the traditional economic argument of an immanent contradiction be-
tween competitiveness and an ambitious environmental policy. The strong intercorre-
lation of the ‘third factor’ GNP with environmental policy and economic competitive-
ness can be explained by the following formula: Highly developed countries are 
characterized by both high perceived environmental pressure and high capacity to 
react to that pressure. The interplay of both factors is the main driving force for envi-
ronmental innovation. 
Thesis 9. The open (‘globalized’) national economy is characterized by strong gov-
ernment, both in size and scope. The fear of a general economic pressure, linked to 
the globalization process, which would reduce the role of governments, especially in 
open, globalized national economies, has not been supported by empirical research. 
Cross-national studies have shown, for example, that public expenditures in open 
economies in the OECD tend to be relatively higher (see Cameron, 1978; Garret, 
1998; Bernauer, 2000). It seems plausible to assume that countries that are highly 
integrated into the international economy tend to have large governments and a lar-
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ger scope of government activities. Open economies (1) need a well developed infra-
structure for successful international competition, which in turn means more money 
and more public activities in fields such as education, R&D or transport; (2) require 
that there be compensational, distributional and other effects of rapid structural 
changes connected, for example, with a low degree of protection of domestic indus-
tries; and (3) need more regulatory activities of all kinds that are necessary to adapt 
to international developments such as global standards.  
Thesis 10. New environmental technologies are created within national ‘lead mar-
kets’, which are induced by government support. The governance of environmental 
flows at the global level as well as the ecological modernization of the world market 
depends on the existence of national lead markets for environmental innovations 
(Jänicke and Jacob, 2001; Beise, 2001). The U.S. as lead market for the Internet, 
Japan as lead market for the fax machine, or Finland as lead market for mobile 
phones are well known examples. Empirically, lead markets are characterized by, for 
example, high per capita incomes, demanding and innovative buyers, high quality 
standards and pressures for further innovation (see also F. Meyer-Krahmer, 1999). 
 Lead markets for environmental technologies, however, are characterized by two 
additional factors: First, environmental innovations relate to global environmental 
needs. This means that there is a global market potential. The possibility of global 
market potential may help us to understand why the environmental issue is not in a 
hopeless situation in the global economy. Second, lead markets for environmental 
innovations are typically not only stimulated by higher environmental preferences of 
consumers in that country. Due to market failures, lead markets also depend on spe-
cial promotion measures (sometimes by NGOs), or by political intervention in the 
market. To cite an expert on car industry: “…a complex interplay has begun between 
regulation and competition. The regulatory drive to push down…emissions has 
forced companies to compete against each other on environmental criteria” 
(McLauchlin, 2004).   
 Here again, the role of the highly developed nation state and of pioneer countries 
is crucial: In times of economic globalization, multinational enterprises are still in 
need of both production locations where the risky take-off of a new environmental 
technology finds public support, and of innovative buyers who are willing to pay a 
higher price and accept initial technological problems until the innovation becomes 
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cheap and sophisticated enough to succeed on global markets. Regulators in Den-
mark and Germany created favorable market conditions, and energy consumers in 
both countries were willing to bear the initially high price for wind power technology 
until it became competitive and profitable on the global market. Needless to say, that 
the strengthening of wind power results in a reduction of problematic environmental 
flows, e.g., from fossil fuels or nuclear energy. 
Reservations 
The foregoing arguments should not, however, be misunderstood as an overly opti-
mistic picture of the role of the environmental state in the global arena. In general, we 
are not very successful in the field of environmental protection. And the task of gov-
erning environmental flows within the system of production and consumption has 
proven to be even more difficult. So far the volume of material flows has steadily in-
creased, while at the same time the environmental quality of these flows has not 
been significantly improved. The question is, however, whether globalization is really 
the main obstacle to - or also an opportunity for - far-reaching environmental pro-
gress. 
 Two important reservations need to be stressed. First of all, so far it is only the 
highly developed nation state which has preserved or even increased its environ-
mental capacity in the context of globalization. The situation of the less developed 
countries is still very different. The second caveat is even more important in our con-
text: Pioneer policy in the field of the environment has so far proven to be successful 
mainly with a ‘technology-based’ policy approach of ecological modernisation 
(Jänicke, 1985, Mol 2001). We must acknowledge that structural solutions—changes 
in the structure of industrial branches or in lifestyles—are much more difficult to 
achieve. In this case, the mechanisms of the market system and those related to the 
competition for innovation cannot be used, which limits the range of policy options. 
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Conclusion 
Bearing in mind these reservations, I come to the following conclusions: 
The (theoretical) concept of the environmental state seems to be useful to describe 
the role of government in a more comprehensive approach to ecological moderniza-
tion here being understood as cleaning and reducing environmental flows within the 
system of production and consumption. This approach requires multi-level, multi-
sectoral and multi-stakeholder governance. In this context, the environmental state 
may be conceived as the core of environmental governance. 
 There are, however, three empirical challenges to the environmental state: The 
first is the new role of government within the complex set of actor constellations, re-
ferred to as ‘environmental governance.’ The second is the role of the nation-state in 
the context of political globalization. Finally, there is the role of the nation state in the 
context of economic globalization. 
 The role of government has changed in the context of globalization. But neither the 
increased importance of global markets nor that of global governance have weak-
ened the role of national governments in environmental policy. The scope of action of 
individual states has sometimes been reduced, but ‘governments in concert’ have 
expanded and coordinated their regulatory powers. Pioneer policies, regulatory com-
petition, and technological competition initiated by advanced industrial countries play 
an important role in the development of global environmental governance.  
 Beyond traditional forms of regulation, the governance of environmental flows in 
the sphere of production and consumption needs goal-oriented, cooperative and par-
ticipative approaches of all kind. But to stress my point once again, the role of gov-
ernment has changed, not diminished. New management capacities are necessary to 
make the cooperative approaches more effective. Today, regulatory policy has often 
a rather latent than manifest function. But the importance of regulatory policy has not 
been reduced. On the contrary, currently new intelligent and more flexible regulatory 
instruments have been introduced (top-runner approach, feed-in tariffs, emission 
trading). There is no substitute for elected governments on different political levels 
when it comes to final responsibilities. It is their role to give the guarantee that the 
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most pressing environmental problems—from climate change to the dissipation of 
toxic substances—are finally solved.  
 There is also no substitute for the nation state in multi-level environmental govern-
ance as regards financial resources, professional competence,manpower, coercive 
power, or public pressure. As a rule, the state is also part of highly differentiated 
global and domestic expert networks. It has the highest visibility and is the ‘first ad-
dress’ in case of complaints.  
 There is no doubt that even in pioneer countries, there is no reason to be satisfied 
with national environmental policies. But an ambitious approach to manage environ-
mental flows should start from the existing national best practices. And if there is no 
substitute to government and to the nation-state, we should finally start improving 
their role and capacity in environmental governance on different levels. 
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Notes 
 
1 Factor 4 and Factor 10 are closely related doctrines regarding environmental protection in which the case is 
made that mere pollution control is inadequate; Factor 4/10 proponents argue that true environmental progress 
requires very substantial dematerialization of production. Factor 4 and Factor 10 refer to different goals for de-
materialization. Factor Four is the title of a book by von Weizsäcker, Lovins, and Lovins (1998) in which the 
authors made the case that a 75 percent reduction of material throughput in reduction is necessary. Factor 10 is a 
more lofty goal for dematerialization; Factor 10 has two assumptions: first, there is a need to reduce materials 
consumption globally by at least 50 percent; and second, for equity reasons—because 20 percent of the world’s 
population consumes 80 percent of the world’s natural resources—the advanced countries should aim for a 10-
fold improvement in resource efficiency. 
